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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate optimal resource alloca-
tion in a power beacon-assisted wireless-powered communication
network (PB-WPCN), which consists of a set of hybrid access
point (AP)-source pairs and a power beacon (PB). Each source,
which has no embedded power supply, first harvests energy
from its associated AP and/or the PB in the downlink (DL) and
then uses the harvested energy to transmit information to its
AP in the uplink (UL). We consider both cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios based on whether the PB is cooperative
with the APs or not. For the cooperative scenario, we formulate
a social welfare maximization problem to maximize the weighted
sum-throughput of all AP-source pairs, which is subsequently
solved by a water-filling based distributed algorithm. In the non-
cooperative scenario, all the APs and the PB are assumed to be
rational and self-interested such that incentives from each AP
are needed for the PB to provide wireless charging service. We
then formulate an auction game and propose an auction based
distributed algorithm by considering the PB as the auctioneer and
the APs as the bidders. Finally, numerical results are performed
to validate the convergence of both the proposed algorithms and
demonstrate the impacts of various system parameters.
Index Terms—Power beacon-assisted wireless-powered com-
munication network (PB-WPCN), wireless energy transfer
(WET), resource allocation, auction theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, wireless energy transfer (WET) technologies have
drawn wide attention with their capability of energy supply [2].
Conventionally, the very limited energy of wireless devices
powered by batteries largely constrains the communication
performance in many practical cases such as wireless sensor
networks [3]. Also, the battery replacement for wireless de-
vices is not always convenient or feasible in many applications.
These challenging issues have boosted the development of
WET technologies, which enable wireless devices to harvest
energy from wireless signals for their intended applications. As
one category of existing WET techniques, the radio frequency
(RF)-enabled WET [4] considered in this paper, provides the
feasibility of a long-range energy transfer (up to tens of
meters [5]) compared to other technologies, such as inductive
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coupling [6] and magnetic resonance coupling [7]. RF-enabled
WET has not been widely used in practice largely due to the
high propagation loss of RF signals. However, due to the lat-
est breakthroughs in wireless communications, namely small
cells [8], transmission using large-scale antenna arrays (i.e.,
massive MIMO) [9], millimeter-wave communications [10],
the transmission distances would be dramatically reduced and
sharp beamforming could be enabled, which will significantly
reduce the propagation loss and achieve much higher WET
efficiencies [5]. Furthermore, the energy consumption of users
will be continuously reduced by the advancements in low-
power electronics [11]. Thus, we believe that the RF-enabled
WET has a great potential to be widely implemented in the
next-generation wireless communication systems. Then, by
considering the RF-enabled WET technique, a fully wireless-
powered communication network (WPCN) can be established
with no need of battery replacement [2]. In a WPCN, wireless
devices are only powered by WET in the downlink (DL) and
transmit their information using the harvested energy in the
uplink (UL) [12].
In open literature, there have been several papers that
focused on the design of WPCNs for different setups [11]–
[15]. In [12], a “harvest-then-transmit” protocol was proposed
for a multi-user WPCN, where users first harvest energy from
RF signals broadcast by a single antenna hybrid access point
(AP) in the DL and then transmit information to the AP in the
UL via time division multiple access (TDMA). Moreover, the
DL WET time from the AP and UL information transmission
time of individual users were jointly optimized to maximize
the system sum-throughput. [13] extended [12] to a multi-
antenna WPCN scenario, where a multi-antenna AP enables
the simultaneous UL transmission via space division multiple
access (SDMA). [14] and [15] considered full-duplex WPCNs,
where a full-duplex AP is adopted to provide the simultaneous
DL WET and UL information transmission. Moreover, [16]–
[18] focused on the development of cooperative protocols for
WPCNs with different setups. In all aforementioned papers,
only AP is considered as the energy source of the whole
network. In [11], the authors proposed the idea of deploying
dedicated power nodes, named power beacons (PBs), to enable
WET in the DL. By resorting to the stochastic geometry
theory, the densities and transmit power of PBs are investigated
under data links’ outage constraint. With this PB-based WET,
we thus could consider a new network setup, named “PB-
assisted WPCN (PB-WPCN)”, in which each user can harvest
ar
X
iv
:1
50
8.
01
61
7v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  7
 A
ug
 20
15
2wireless energy not only from the AP but also from the
deployed PB. For this new model, a natural question that arises
is “how to optimally allocate the resources of PB-WPCNs,
including the PBs’ energy, and the time for DL WET as well
as the UL information transmission?”. To the best of our
knowledge, this is still an open question, which motivates
this paper.
In this paper, we consider a PB-WPCN consisting of one
multi-antenna PB and multiple single-antenna AP-source pairs.
In view of the state of art and trend of RF energy transfer
[4], the considered network setup is very likely to find its
applications in the practical scenario of small cells, such as
picocells (range from 10 to 100 meters) and femtocells (WiFi-
like range), which has been regarded as one of the key enabling
technologies of the upcoming 5G cellular networks [8]. It
is also worth mentioning that although introducing the PB
may result in some extra cost and complexity to the system,
this could be beneficial as a whole based on the following
considerations: (1) The PB could be dedicated designed for
WET only and thus can achieve a higher WET efficiency
by exploiting the benefits of energy beamforming enabled
by multiple antennas [19], [20]. (2) The deployment of the
PB could be more flexible since it has much looser backhaul
requirement. (3) By using both the AP and PB to perform
WET simultaneously, the transmit diversity could be achieved
and thus could make the RF energy harvesting at the user
side more robust. We consider that the APs and the PB are
connected to constant power supplies. Each AP aims to collect
the information from its associated source. It is assumed that
each source has no embedded energy supply but has the ability
to harvest and store the energy from RF signals broadcast by
its AP and/or the PB. The PB is installed to assist APs during
the DL WET phase by providing wireless charging service.
Note that the energy allocation of the PB and time allocation
of each AP-source pair are tangled together. This makes the
distributed and optimal resource allocation for the considered
PB-WPCN non-trivial at all. The main contributions of this
paper are two-fold.
Firstly, we consider a cooperative scenario, where all the
AP-source pairs and the PB are cooperative to maximize the
network social welfare, which is defined as the weighted sum-
throughput of all AP-source pairs. This is done by jointly
optimizing the DL WET time of each AP and the energy
allocation of the PB. A water-filling based algorithm is sub-
sequently proposed to optimally solve the formulated social
welfare maximization problem in a distributed manner. Note
that this cooperative scenario can correspond to the situation
that APs and the PB are deployed by the same operator, as
the one considered in [11].
Secondly, we consider a non-cooperative scenario, where
all the APs and the PB are assumed to be rational and self-
interested. This scenario could be used to model the case that
the APs and the PB are installed by different operators. The
PB will ask a monetary payment on its wireless charging
service and the APs will measure its benefits obtained from
the achievable throughput with its payment to the PB. The
conflicting interactions among the APs and the PB can be
modeled by game theory. Specifically, we formulate an auction
Hybrid Access Point Source Power Beacon
Information Transfer
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Fig. 1. System model for the proposed PB-WPCN.
game for this non-cooperative scenario based on the well-
known Ausubel auction [21], which induces truthful bidding
and achieves the maximum social welfare [21]–[24]. In this
formulated game, the APs are bidders and the PB is the
seller as well as the auctioneer. An auction based distributed
algorithm is proposed to analyze the formulated game and
its convergence is subsequently proved. Note that auction
theory [22] has been well investigated and widely applied
for designing the resource allocation in cognitive radio net-
works [25], D2D communication networks [26], cooperative
communication networks [27] as well as energy harvesting
networks [28], [29]. A cooperative network with multiple
source-destination pairs and a relay was considered in [28],
where an auction based power allocation scheme was proposed
to allocate the harvested energy of the relay in a distributed
manner. [29] formulated a non-cooperative game to model the
competitive WET bidding of the users in a WPCN with one AP
and multiple users, where the AP adopted auction mechanism
for DL WET. Both [28] and [29] adopted the concept of
Nash equilibrium to evaluate the strategic interactions between
bidders only. In contrast, in this paper we adopt a different
auction mechanism to study the hierarchal interaction between
the PB (auctioneer) and the AP-source pairs (bidders).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
elaborate the system model in Section II. Then, a social
welfare maximization problem for the cooperative scenario
is formulated and a water-filling based distributed algorithm
is proposed in Section III. In section IV, an auction game
for the non-cooperative scenario is designed and an auction
based distributed algorithm is proposed. Section V presents
the numerical results. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, as shown in Fig. 1, we consider a PB-WPCN
with one PB and N APs associated with N (information)
sources. Each AP aims to collect the information from its
associated source. We denote by N = {1, · · · , N} the set
of AP-source pairs and the ith AP-source pair consists of the
ith AP and the ith (associated) source, ∀i ∈ N . We consider
that each source has no fixed energy supplies and thus needs
3to replenish energy from the signal1 sent by its AP and/or
the PB. The APs and the PB are connected to constant power
supplies. We also consider that all APs are connected with
the PB via backhaul but they are not connected with each
other directly. We assume that all the AP-source pairs work
on orthogonal frequency bands, while the PB can work on all
frequency bands. All AP-source pairs work in the half-duplex
mode. The APs and sources are each equipped with one single
antenna and the PB is equipped with M > 1 antennas. Full
channel state information (CSI) is assumed to be available at
the transmitter side.
We exploit the “harvest-then-transmit” protocol proposed
in [12]. Specifically, each source first harvests energy from
RF signals broadcast by its associated AP and/or the PB in
the DL and then uses the harvested energy for information
transmission in the UL. By considering that the sources may be
low-cost, low-complexity and low-energy devices, we assume
that an integrated architecture is adopted at each source,
where the energy harvesting component and the information
processing component are integrated together by using one
rectifier circuit [31]. In this context, each source can only
harvest energy from the RF signals with the frequency inside
its working band2, which means that each source can only
harvest energy from its own AP and/or the PB.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, we assume that all APs and PB
perform WET to sources simultaneously from the beginning
of each transmission block T . We denote by τi the fraction of
a transmission block T for DL WET from the ith AP to the
ith source, and we denote by τ ′i the fraction for DL WET from
the PB to the ith source. Then the DL WET time for the ith
source is thus given by max (τi, τ ′i) T . During the remaining
time (1−max (τi, τ ′i)) T , the ith source uses the harvested
energy to transmit its information to its corresponding AP in
the UL. For convenience and without loss of generality, we
assume that T = 1 in the sequel of this paper.
We assume that the DL and UL channels are reciprocal.
Let scalar gi denote the complex channel between the ith AP
and the ith source and let ki ∈ CM×1 denote the complex
channel vector between the PB and the ith source, where
CM×1 denotes a set of all complex vectors of size M × 1.
Besides, we use wi ∈ CM×1 to denote the beamforming
vector at the PB applied to the energy signal transmitted to
the ith source with ‖wi‖2 = 1, where ‖wi‖ is the Euclidean
norm of wi. It is assumed that the ith AP transmits with
power pi to the ith source and the PB transmits to each
1Note that the energy signal could be designed as a zero-mean pseudo-
random signal with arbitrary distribution as long as its power spectral density
satisfies certain regulations on radio signal radiation for the operating band
of interest since it does not carry any intentional information [30].
2Note that if the sources are advanced enough such that they are equipped
with separated front-end hardware for the energy harvesting unit and the
information processing unit, it is also interesting to consider the case that
the RF energy transfer is performed in a wideband manner and the sources
can harvest energy over all frequency bands. However, the design of such a
system with wideband energy transfer would be quite different from and much
more complicated than the considered one with narrowband energy transfer.
Thus, as the initial effort towards the design of the PB-WPCN, we choose
to focus on the case with narrowband energy transfer in this paper and we
would like to consider the design of another interesting setup with wideband
energy transfer as our future work.
DL WET from the th
AP to the th source
i
i
DL WET from the PB 
to the th sourcei
UL information transmission from 
the th source to the th APi i
Fig. 2. An illustration of the time diagram for ith AP-source pair in a
transmission block T .
source on different frequency bands3 with the same power pb.
Furthermore, the PB is constrained by a total energy during
each transmission block, denoted by Etotb , which leads to a
total energy constraint4
∑
i∈N τ
′
ipb ≤ Etotb .
Then, during the DL WET phase, the received signal at the
ith source, denoted by yi, can be expressed as follows when
both the ith AP and the PB perform WET to the ith source,
yi =
√
pigixi,AP +
√
pbw
H
i kixi,PB + ni, (1)
where xi,AP and xi,PB are the transmitted signals from
the ith AP and the PB to the ith source, respectively, with
E
[
|xi,AP |2
]
= 1 and E
[
|xi,PB |2
]
= 1. E [·] denotes the
expectation. (·)H is the Hermitian transpose. ni is the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with a zero mean and variance
σ2. Note that the first or the second term on the right-hand
side of (1) should be removed when only the PB or the ith
AP transfers energy to the ith source.
Since the multi-antenna PB transmits energy signal to a
single-antenna source and full CSI is available at the PB,
the optimal energy beamforming vector at the PB should be
maximum ratio transmission (MRT) [20], [32]. We thus have
wi =
ki
‖ki‖ . Therefore, at the end of WET phase, the amount
of energy harvested by the ith source, denoted by Esi , can be
written by
Esi = η (τipiGi + τ
′
ipbKi) , (2)
where 0 < η < 1 is the energy conversion efficiency, Gi ,
|gi|2 is the channel power gain between the ith AP and the
ith source, Ki , ‖ki‖2 is the equivalent channel power gain
between the PB and the ith source, and the harvested energy
from the noise is ignored since it is negligible in practice
[31]. We also define that G , [G1, · · · , GN ]H and K ,
[K1, · · · ,KN ]H, respectively. Note that the derivation from (1)
3Multi-input single-output and orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
(MISO-OFDM) can be adopted at the PB to power the sources on different
frequency bands via multiple antennas.
4 Generally, an energy consumption constraint should also be imposed to
each AP as that to the PB. But, the energy consumption requirement at the
APs could be easily satisfied because we consider that the APs are connected
to constant power supplies and only serve their own source with fixed transmit
power. In contrast, the PB needs to transmit wireless energy to multiple
sources and its energy consumption constraint could be frequently violated
when the number of sources becomes large. Moreover, it is worth mentioning
that the proposed distributed algorithm elaborated in Section III can readily
be extended to solve the problem with additional energy constraints for the
APs. For the purpose of exposition, in this paper we choose to ignore the
energy constraint at each AP.
4to (2) is carried out based on the assumption that the signals
transmitted by the AP and PB are mutually independent as in
[28], [33], [34].
After the source replenishes its energy in the DL, it then
transmits its information to the AP in the UL. It is assumed
that the harvested energy is exhausted by the source for
information transmission. The effect of energy storage and
energy consumption of the circuit is disregarded for clarity as
in [12], [13]. The transmit power of the ith source, denoted
by qi, is thus equal to
qi =
Esi
1−max{τi, τ ′i}
=
η (τipiGi + τ
′
ipbKi)
1−max (τi, τ ′i)
. (3)
Then, the achievable throughput at the ith AP can be written as
Ri (τi, τ
′
i) = (1−max (τi, τ ′i))W log2
(
1 +
Giqi
σ2
)
= (1−max (τi, τ ′i))W
× log2
(
1 +
Giη (τipiGi + τ
′
ipbKi)
(1−max (τi, τ ′i))σ2
)
,
(4)
where W is the bandwidth and σ2 is the noise power, which
are assumed to be the same for all AP-source pairs, without
loss of generality. It can be observed from (4) that the
achievable throughput for the ith source to its AP can be
increased with the assistance of the PB.
In this paper, we consider both cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios based on whether the PB is cooperative
with the APs or not. In the cooperative scenario, the PB and
the APs cooperate to maximize the network social welfare,
defined as the weighted sum-throughput of all AP-source pairs.
In contrast, the PB and the APs are considered to be self-
interested in the non-cooperative scenario. More specifically,
the PB will ask a monetary compensation for its wireless
charging service and each AP-source pair will value its benefits
with its payment to the PBs. We will design the resource
allocation schemes for these two scenarios in the following
sections, respectively.
III. COOPERATIVE SCENARIO
In this section, we first formulate a social welfare maxi-
mization problem for the cooperative scenario and then solve
it with a water-filling based algorithm in a distributed manner.
A. Problem Formulation
We consider a weight λi > 0 for the ith AP, which
represents a gain per unit throughput from the ith source to
its AP. Then, the social welfare maximization problem can be
formulated as
max
{τi},{τ ′i}
∑
i∈N
λiRi (τi, τ
′
i) ,
s.t. τi, τ ′i ≥ 0, 0 < max (τi, τ ′i) < 1, ∀i ∈ N ,∑
i∈N
τ ′ipb ≤ Etotb ,
(5)
where the constraint 0 < max (τi, τ ′i) < 1 guarantees that the
weighted sum-throughput is larger than zero. By observing
the objective function of problem (5), we obtain the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. The function Ri (τi, τ ′i) in (4) can be rewritten as
Ri (τi, Ei) = (1− τi)W log2
(
1 +
Giη (τipiGi + EiKi)
(1− τi)σ2
)
,
(6)
where Ei , τ ′ipb is the amount of energy that the PB allocates
to the ith source.
Proof : We first prove that max{τi, τ ′i} = τi by contradic-
tion. If τi < τ ′i , then max{τi, τ ′i} = τ ′i and (4) becomes
Ri (τi, τ
′
i) = (1− τ ′i)W log2
(
1 +
Giη (τipiGi + τ
′
ipbKi)
(1− τ ′i)σ2
)
.
(7)
We can easily see that the right-hand side of (7) is a monoton-
ically increasing function of τi. This means that the achievable
throughput Ri can always be enhanced by increasing the value
of τi to that of τ ′i . This contradicts the assumption that τi < τ
′
i .
We thus have τi ≥ τ ′i , i.e., max{τi, τ ′i} = τi. Furthermore, for
the ease of presentation, we define that Ei , τ ′ipb, which is
the amount of energy that the PB allocates to the ith source.
Applying these two operations into (4), we can rewrite it as
(6), which completes this proof. 
Based on Lemma 1, we can reformulate the problem (5) as
max
τ ,E
∑
i∈N
λiRi (τi, Ei) ,
s.t. 0 ≺ τ ≺ 1,
0  E  τpb,∑
i∈N
Ei ≤ Etotb ,
(8)
where τ , [τ1, · · · , τN ]T and E , [E1, · · · , EN ]T , the
symbols ≺ and  represent the element-wise inequality, 0 or
1 is a vector of zeros or ones that has the same size as τ and
E, and the constraint of E is derived based on Ei = τ ′ipb and
0 ≤ τ ′i ≤ τi. Moreover, we denote by (τ ∗,E∗) the optimal
solution to the problem (8).
We can see from (8) that the social welfare can only be
maximized by jointly designing the DL WET time of each
AP and the energy allocation of the PB. It is worth noting
that τ and E are mutually interdependent and the achievable
throughput of all APs are coupled together due to the total en-
ergy constraint
∑
i∈N Ei ≤ Etotb .
B. Optimal Solution and Distributed Algorithm
The convexity of the objective function in problem (8)
can readily be checked by introducing a new optimization
variable θi = 1 − max{τi, τ ′i}, ∀i ∈ N . Substituting θi into
(4), we can observe that Ri (τi, τ ′i) is jointly concave on τi,
τ ′i and θi, since θi is the perspective variable of the log.
Accordingly, the problem (8) is convex and could be solved by
applying standard convex optimization approaches. However,
these approaches are normally done in a centralized manner.
In practice, a distributed approach is of more interest because
5it can significantly reduce the network overhead. Motivated
by this, we propose a distributed method with three steps to
resolve it in this section. In step 1, we first find the optimal
relationship between τi and Ei by expressing τi as a function
of Ei. Then, the problem (8) can be reformulated as a problem
with only E as a variable. In step 2, we investigate the
properties of the reformulated problem. Finally, a water-filling
based algorithm is proposed to find the optimal solution of the
new problem in step 3. We describe the details of these three
steps in the following subsections.
1) Step 1. Problem Reformulation: We first derive the
expression of τi as a function of Ei for each AP. With a
given E that satisfies 0  E ≺ 1pb and
∑
i∈N Ei ≤ Etotb ,
the problem (8) is decoupled and we can have the following
optimization problem for each AP regarding τi,
max
τi
Si (τi) , s.t. 0 < τi < 1, τi ≥ Ei
pb
, (9)
where Si (τi) can be expressed by
Si (τi) = λiRi (τi, Ei)
= λiW (1− τi) log2
(
1 +
Giη (τipiGi + EiKi)
(1− τi)σ2
)
.
(10)
We denote by τi(Ei) the optimal solution of (9), which is
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given Ei ∈ [0, pb), the optimal solution τi (Ei)
to the problem (9) can be expressed by
τi (Ei) =

(z†i−1)σ2−GiηEiKi
(z†i−1)σ2+G2iηpi
, if 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Elimi ,
Ei
pb
, if Elimi < Ei < pb,
(11)
where
Elimi ,
pb
(
z†i − 1
)
σ2(
z†i − 1
)
σ2 +Giη (piGi + pbKi)
, (12)
and zi† > 1 can be expressed by
z†i = exp
(
W
(
G2i ηpi − σ2
σ2 exp(1)
)
+ 1
)
, (13)
in whichW (x) is the LambertW function that is the solution
to the equality x =W exp(W).
Proof : See Appendix A. 
Then, by replacing τi in Si (τi) with τi (Ei) given in
Proposition 1, we have a function Si (Ei) with only Ei as
the variable given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Si (Ei) can be expressed by
Si (Ei) =
λiWGiη(piGi+EiKi)
z†i σ2 ln 2
, if 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Elimi ,
λiW
(
1− Eipb
)
log2
(
1 + XiEipb−Ei
)
, if Elimi < Ei < pb,
(14)
where Xi , Giη(piGi+pbKi)σ2 .
Proof : See Appendix B. 
Hence, we now can reformulate the problem (8) with only
E as the variable as follows
max
E
∑
i∈N
Si (Ei) , s.t. 0  E ≺ 1pb,
∑
i∈N
Ei ≤ Etotb .
(15)
Note that we can solve the problem (15) to obtain E?, and
then we can calculate τ ? based on (11), thereby solving the
original problem (8).
2) Step 2. Property Characterization: To solve the problem
(15), we first characterize the properties of the objective
function
∑
i∈N Si (Ei). Since
∑
i∈N Si (Ei) is a positive
summation of N independent functions with the same struc-
ture, we then first investigate the property of any function
Si (Ei), which is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. When 0 ≤ Ei < pb, Si (Ei) is differentiable
and the gradient of Si (Ei), denoted by ∇Si (Ei), is continu-
ous. ∇Si (Ei) is derived as
∇Si (Ei) =
{
αi, if 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Elimi ,
βi (Ei) , if Elimi < Ei < pb,
(16)
where αi is a constant given by
αi =
λiWGiηKi
z†i σ2 ln 2
, (17)
and βi (Ei) is strictly decreasing, which is expressed as
βi (Ei) =− λiW
pb
log2
(
1 +
XiEi
pb − Ei
)
+
λiWXi
(pb − Ei +XiEi) ln 2 .
(18)
Proof : See Appendix B. 
Therefore, based on Proposition 2, it is easy to show that
Si (Ei) is a concave function of Ei when 0 ≤ Ei < pb. Then,
by letting the first-order derivative of Si (Ei) be equal to zero,
i.e., βi (Ei) = 0, we obtain the stationary point that maximizes
Si (Ei), denoted by Eoi , given by
Eoi =
pb
(
z‡i − 1
)
σ2(
z‡i − 1
)
σ2 +Giη (piGi + pbKi)
, (19)
where z‡i > 1 can be expressed as
z‡i = exp
(
W
(
Giη (piGi + pbKi)− σ2
σ2 exp(1)
)
+ 1
)
. (20)
Note that Eoi has the same structure as E
lim
i given in (12). The
only differences between them are the parameters z‡i and z
†
i .
Furthermore, we can easily observe that z‡i > z
†
i > 1 based
on the property of the equation (41) in Appendix A. Let us
divide both the top and the bottom of the right-hand side in
(19) by
(
z‡i − 1
)
σ2 ( in (12) by
(
z†i − 1
)
σ2). We thus can
obtain that Elimi < E
o
i < pb. Now, we have an important
property of Si (Ei): it is increasing when 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Eoi and
decreasing when Eoi < Ei < pb. The PB will at most allocate
the amount of energy that is equal to Eoi to the ith AP to
achieve the maximization of the social welfare. We thus only
6need to focus on the interval 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Eoi for each AP. We
now can update the property of the function Si (Ei) over the
interval 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Eoi in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. For 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Eoi , Si (Ei) is differentiable,
increasing and concave, and∇Si (Ei) is continuous.∇Si (Ei)
is constant when 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Elimi while strictly decreasing
when Elimi < Ei < E
o
i and equal to zero when Ei = E
o
i .
For the ease of understanding, functions τi (Ei), Si (Ei)
and ∇Si (Ei), given in (11), (14) and (16), respectively, are
graphically interpreted in Fig. 3. We use the black and red
curves to characterize the functions in the intervals 0 ≤ Ei ≤
Elimi and E
lim
i < Ei < pb, respectively. We can see from
Fig. 3(a) that τi (Ei) linearly decreases in the interval 0 ≤
Ei ≤ Elimi , but linearly increases when Elimi < Ei < pb.
The harvesting time from the PB τ ′i =
Ei
pb
is also shown in
Fig. 3(a) using the blue dashed line, which is always linearly
increasing in the whole interval and coincides with the red
curve in the interval Elimi < Ei < pb. It can be observed
in Fig. 3(b) that Si (Ei) is linearly increasing in the interval
0 ≤ Ei ≤ Elimi , which corresponds to the observation in
Fig. 3(c) that ∇Si (Ei) is constant for 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Elimi . With
the increasing of Ei, Si (Ei) is maximized at the point Eoi ,
where ∇Si (Ei) equals zero. Finally, when Eoi < Ei < pb,
Si (Ei) keeps decreasing and ∇Si (Ei) is shown to be always
negative.
3) Step 3. A Distributed Algorithm: Based on the analysis
in step 2, the optimization problem (15) can be written as
max
E
∑
i∈N
Si (Ei) ,
s.t. 0  E  Eo,∑
i∈N
Ei ≤ Etotb ,
(21)
where Eo , [Eo1 · · · , EoN ]T . Based on the property of Si (Ei)
summarized in Proposition 3, we then can solve the problem
(21) using a water-filling based approach [35]. It should be
noted that when Etotb ≥
∑
i∈N E
o
i , the optimization problem
(21) has a trivial solution that E?i = E
o
i , ∀i ∈ N . We thus
only consider the case that Etotb <
∑
i∈N E
o
i , namely, the
PB’s energy will be exhausted to enhance the social welfare.
The optimal solution E? to the problem (21) can be presented
by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The optimal solution to the problem (21) is
given by E? = [E?1 , · · · , E?N ]T with
E?i =

γi (ν) , if 0 ≤ ν < αi,
Etotb −
∑
j∈N\{i}E
?
j , if ν = αi
0, if ν > αi,
(22)
where ν ≥ 0 is a constant chosen to meet the total energy
constraint
∑
i∈N E
?
i = E
tot
b and γi (ν) is a strictly decreasing
function on 0 ≤ ν < αi given by
γi (ν) =
pb
(
z§i − 1
)
σ2(
z§i − 1
)
σ2 +Giη (piGi + pbKi)
, (23)
where z§i > 1 is the unique solution of the equation
zi ln (zi) +
(
νpb ln 2
λiW
− 1
)
zi + 1 =
Giη (piGi + pbKi)
σ2
.
(24)
Proof : See Appendix C. 
According to Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, there exists
a unique ν to meet the total energy constraint. However, from
Proposition 4, if ν = αi, then E?i has a unique solution only
under the assumption that each AP corresponds to a different
αi, ∀i ∈ N . This is because E?j , ∀j ∈ N\{i} is unique when
ν 6= αj . If there is at least another AP, say the kth AP, k ∈
N\{i}, and ν = αk = αi, then the optimality can be achieved
with multiple solutions. Based on the proof of Proposition 4,
the solutions of E?i and E
?
k can be any combination, which
is subject to that 0 ≤ E?i ≤ Elimi , 0 ≤ E?k ≤ Elimk and
E?i + E
?
k = E
tot
b −
∑
j∈N\{i,k}E
?
j .
Next, we propose a water-filling based distributed algorithm
to obtain E? by finding the constant ν. Note that we only
consider the case that each AP corresponds to a different αi,
which can be readily modified to adapt to the case that multiple
APs have the same αi. For convenience and without loss of
generality, we assume that α1 > α2 > · · · > αN . As ν is
unique and ν ≥ 0, a possible value of ν could be αi, ∀i ∈ N ,
or between an interval (αi+1, αi), where αN+1 , 0. Note
that when the optimal ν falls into an interval between any
two adjacent αi’s, we need to apply the iterative water-filling
algorithm [36] to achieve it. Specifically, after the PB releases
the current energy price in each round, all the APs update
their bids in parallel and feedback them to the PB within the
current round.
We now elaborate the steps in Algorithm 1. Each AP first
provides its αi to the PB, then the PB constructs a descending
sequence {αi}i∈N , sets i = 1 and announces ν(i), which is
equal to each αi, sequentially. Then, with ν(i), the jth AP,
∀j ∈ N\{i}, computes the response, here denoted by E(i)j ,
according to (22), while5 the ith AP responds that E(i)i =
Elimi . Then, by comparing the aggregate of all the responses,
computed by E(i)agg =
∑
j∈N\{i}E
(i)
j + E
(i)
i , with E
tot
b , the
PB can decide the value of ν as listed in Algorithm 1. Note
that if ν exists in an interval, then a bisection method [37] can
be employed to find the unique value. The implementation of
the bisection method is simple and thus omitted. It can be
observed that Algorithm 1 can always find the exact value or
the existing interval of ν with at most N iterations, since ν is
unique and 0 ≤ ν ≤ maxi∈N {αi}.
According to Algorithm 1, each AP first needs to measure
the (equivalent) channel power gains Gi and Ki, and acquire
the transmit power pb from the PB. The values calculated by
each AP and forwarded to the PB should be αi given in (17),
5According to Proposition 4, given ν = αi, the response energy for the ith
AP is that E?i = E
tot
b −
∑
j∈N\{i} E
?
j . However, this happens only when
ν is found to meet the total energy constraint. As proved in Appendix C,
given ν = αi, under the assumption that the ith AP does not know the total
energy constraint, the possible value of E?i exists in an interval
[
0, Elimi
]
.
Therefore, in this case, the ith AP is set to respond that E(i)i = E
lim
i to the
PB. Then the PB knows the interval of the ith AP, which will help it to make
decisions in the following steps.
7(a) τi (Ei) versus Ei. (b) Si (Ei) versus Ei. (c) ∇Si (Ei) versus Ei.
Fig. 3. Graphical interpretations for the functions (11), (14) and (16) in the proposed cooperative scenario.
Algorithm 1 Water-filling based Distributed Algorithm
1: Each AP reflects its αi to the PB.
2: The PB constructs a descending sequence {αi}i∈N , sets
i = 1 and repeats:
1) The PB announces ν(i) = αi to all APs.
2) The jth AP responds an optimal E(i)j to the PB
according to Proposition 4, ∀j ∈ N\{i}, while the
ith AP responds E(i)i = E
lim
i .
3) The PB computes that E(i)agg =
∑
j∈N\{i}E
(i)
j +E
(i)
i
and compares E(i)agg with Etotb :
a) If E(i)agg < Etotb , then set i = i+ 1 and continue.
b) Elseif E(i)agg ≥ Etotb and E(i)agg − Elimi ≤ Etotb ,
then ν = αi, E?j = E
(i)
j , and E
?
i = E
tot
b −∑
j∈N\{i}E
(i)
j .
c) Else, the unique ν ∈ (αi, αi−1), which can be
readily found via a bisection method.
Elimi defined in (12) and the optimal response obtained by
(22). With these signals from the APs, the PB announces ν(i)i
at the end of each iteration and the allocated energy E?i at last
to each AP.
Finally, with the value of ν achieved via Algorithm 1
and (22), we can obtain E?. Subsequently, based on (11)
given in Proposition 1, we have τ?i = τi (E
?
i ) and τ
? =
[τ?1 , · · · , τ?N ]T . Therefore, we have already found the optimal
solution (τ ?,E?) of the original problem (8).
IV. NON-COOPERATIVE SCENARIO
This section investigates the non-cooperative scenario,
where the multiple APs and the PB are assumed to be
rational and self-interested. We adopt an auction model to
characterize the conflicting interactions among the APs and the
PB, where the APs are bidders and the PB is the auctioneer.
In particular, we employ a well-known Ausubel auction [21],
which constructs an ascending-bid version of the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and induces truthful bidding6 as
well as achieves the maximum social welfare, i.e., the global
optimum [21]–[24]. In the sequel, we first define the utility
functions of both APs and the PB. Then we formulate an
auction game, in which an auction based distributed algorithm
6Truthful bidding means that reporting true optimal demand at every
iteration is a mutually best response for each bidder [22].
is proposed. At last, we analyze the formulated game and
prove convergence of the proposed algorithm.
A. Utility functions
We first present the utility functions of APs and the PB,
respectively.
1) The Utility Function of Each AP: Given the unit price
of the PB’s energy, denoted by µ, the payment from the ith
AP can be written by
Γi = µEi. (25)
Therefore, with (6) and (25), the utility function of the ith AP
can be defined as
Ui (τi, Ei, µ) =λiRi (τi, Ei)− Γi
=λi(1− τi)W
× log2
(
1 +
Giη (τipiGi + EiKi)
(1− τi)σ2
)
− µEi.
(26)
2) The Utility Function of the PB: Recall that E =
[E1, · · · , EN ]T . Then, the utility of the PB can be expressed
as
Ub (µ,E) =
∑
i∈N
Γi = µ
∑
i∈N
Ei. (27)
Note that, there is a reserve price for the PB, denoted by
µ(0). It is assumed that if the outcome price of an auction
game is larger than µ(0), the PB would benefit from the trade.
Otherwise, it would not participate in the trade [24], [25].
B. Auction Game
Now, we are ready to formulate an auction game, where the
APs are bidders and the PB is the auctioneer. Each AP submits
bid to compete for the PB’s energy, in order to maximize its
utility defined in (26). On the other hand, the PB aims to
maximize its revenue in (27) by increasing its energy’s unit
price. In particular, the auctioneer first announces an initial
price µ = µ(0), and the bidders respond to the auctioneer
with their optimal demands, i.e., the bids. Then, the auctioneer
raises the price µ until the aggregate demands meet the total
energy constraint, and meanwhile, the auctioneer concludes the
auction and decides the final allocated energy to each bidder.
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1: Given Etotb , price step ∆ > 0, and t = 0, the PB initializes
the asking price µ(0).
2: With µ(0), each AP computes and submits its optimal bid
E
(0)
i with (29).
3: The PB sums up all bids that E(0) = ∑i∈N E(0)i and
compares E(0) with Etotb :
1) If E(0) ≤ Etotb , then the PB ends the auction and
quits the trade.
2) Else, then the PB computes the cumulative clinches
{C(0)i }i∈N by (32), sets µ(t+1) = µ(t)+∆, t = t+1,
and repeats:
a) The PB announces µ(t) to all APs.
b) Given µ(t), each AP updates its optimal bid E(t)i
obtained by (29).
c) The PB sums up all bids that E(t) = ∑i∈N E(t)i
and compares E(t) with Etotb :
i) If E(t) > Etotb , then the PB records the cu-
mulative clinches {C(t)i }i∈N and sequentially
sets µ(t+1) = µ(t)+∆, t = t+1. The auction
continues.
ii) Else, then by setting T = t, the PB concludes
the auction and computes {C(T )i }i∈N with
(33). Then, the PB allocates E˜?i = C(T )i to
the ith AP.
In the formulated game, at each round t ≥ 0, with a given
price µ(t), the ith AP has an optimization problem as
max
τi,Ei
Ui
(
τi, Ei, µ
(t)
)
, s.t. 0 < τi < 1, 0 ≤ Ei ≤ τipb.
(28)
We denote by
(
τ
(t)
i , E
(t)
i
)
the optimal solution of (28). That is(
τ
(t)
i , E
(t)
i
)
= arg max
τi,Ei
Ui
(
τi, Ei, µ
(t)
)
. (29)
Thus the bid of the ith AP is E(t)i given µ
(t). We also denote
by E˜?i and Γ˜
?
i the final allocated energy and the final payment
of the ith AP when the PB concludes the auction. With E˜?i
and Γ˜?i , the utility of the ith AP in (26) becomes to
Ui (τi) = λi(1− τi)W
× log2
1 + Giη
(
τipiGi + E˜
?
iKi
)
(1− τi)σ2
− Γ˜?i . (30)
We then have an optimization problem regarding τi as
max
τi
Ui (τi) , s.t. 0 < τi < 1, τi ≥ E˜
?
i
pb
. (31)
We use τ˜?i to denote the optimal solution to problem (31),
which is the optimal harvesting time of the ith source from
its own AP. Analogue to the proof of Proposition 1, we can
readily get τ˜?i = τi
(
E˜?i
)
, where τi (·) is given by (11).
Algorithm 2 elaborates the auction steps. Before starting
the auction, the PB sets up the iteration index t = 0, the
constant price step7 ∆ > 0, and the initial price µ(0). The
price will be announced to all APs, and each AP will submit
its optimal bid E(0)i based on the optimal response given by
(29). Then the PB sums up all bids that E(0) , ∑i∈N E(0)i ,
and compares E(0) with Etotb . If E(0) ≤ Etotb , then the PB
ends the auction and quits the trade. Otherwise, the PB first
computes a cumulative clinch [21] for each AP, which is the
amount of the PB’s energy that each AP is guaranteed to be
allocated. The cumulative clinch for the ith AP at the round
t ≥ 0 is given by
C(t)i = max
0, Etotb − ∑
j∈N\{i}
E
(t)
j
 . (32)
Then, the PB sets µ(t+1) = µ(t) + ∆, t = t + 1 and updates
µ(t) to all APs.
With the updated µ(t), each AP submits its optimal bid
E
(t)
i based on the optimal response
(
τ
(t)
i , E
(t)
i
)
obtained by
(29). By comparing the aggregate bids E(t) , ∑i∈N E(t)i
with Etotb , if E(t) > Etotb , then the PB records the cumulative
clinches {C(t)i }i∈N and sequentially sets µ(t+1) = µ(t) + ∆,
t = t + 1. The auction continues till E(t) ≤ Etotb . By setting
T = t, the PB concludes the auction and computes the
cumulative clinches {C(T )i }i∈N according to the proportional
rationing rule (PRR) [39] by
C(T )i =E(T )i +
E
(T−1)
i − E(T )i∑
i∈N E
(T−1)
i −
∑
i∈N E
(T )
i
×
(
Etotb −
∑
i∈N
E
(T )
i
)
,
(33)
where C(T )i is actually the finally allocated energy to the ith
AP and it is a sum of its last energy bid and a proportion
of the remaining energy
(
Etotb −
∑
i∈N E
(T )
i
)
. Then, the PB
allocates E˜?i = C(T )i to the ith AP. With E˜?i , the ith AP can
decide its final harvesting time τ˜?i . Hence, the utility of the
ith AP can be expressed by
Ui
(
τ˜?i , E˜
?
i
)
= λi (1− τ˜?i )W
× log2
1 + Giη
(
τ˜?i piGi + E˜
?
iKi
)
(1− τ˜?i )σ2
− Γ˜?i , (34)
where the payment from the ith AP Γ˜?i is given by
Γ˜?i = µ
(0)C(0)i +
T∑
t=1
µ(t)
(
C(t)i − C(t−1)i
)
. (35)
Notice that the term
(
C(t)i − C(t−1)i
)
in (35) is actually the
amount of energy that the ith AP is guaranteed to be allocated
with the announced price µ(t). Their product will be the
corresponding payment of the ith AP at the current round. By
7Note that the constant step normally introduces errors to the convergence
point [38]. However, this is not a problem for the considered auction mech-
anism with the proportional rationing rule (PRR) [39] given in (33), which
guarantees that the total energy of the PB can be entirely allocated at last.
9accumulating these payments generated at each round (from
t = 0 to t = T ), we can have achieve total payment of the ith
AP given in (35). The utility of the PB thus is written by
Ub =
∑
i∈N
Γ˜?i =
∑
i∈N
(
µ(0)C(0)i +
T∑
t=1
µ(t)
(
C(t)i − C(t−1)i
))
.
(36)
C. Analysis of the Formulated Game
In this subsection, we analyze the formulated auction game.
We first derive the optimal solution to problem (28) given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Given a price µ(t) by the PB, the optimal
solution to problem (28) can be expressed as
(
τ
(t)
i , E
(t)
i
)
=

(
(z†i−1)σ2
(z†i−1)σ2+G2iηpi
, 0
)
, if µ(t) ≥ µlimi ,(
γi(µ(t))
pb
, γi
(
µ(t)
))
, if µ(t) < µlimi ,
(37)
where µlimi is defined as the maximum acceptable price for
the ith AP, which is equal to αi in (17), z
†
i and γi (·) are
expressed in (13) and (23), respectively.
Proof : See Appendix D. 
Next, we prove that the proposed auction based distributed
algorithm has the following convergence property.
Proposition 6. The proposed auction based distributed algo-
rithm converges within a finite number of iterations.
Proof : Recall that E(t) = ∑i∈N E(t)i and the auction
concludes when E(t) ≤ Etotb . According to Proposition 5, if
the asking price µ(t) ≥ µlimi , then the ith AP will drop from
the auction with E(t)i = 0. If the asking price µ
(t) < µlimi , then
the ith AP always submits a non-zero bid E(t)i = γi
(
µ(t)
)
.
By referring to Proposition 4, we can show that γi
(
µ(t)
)
is a
strictly decreasing function when 0 ≤ µ(t) < µlimi and when
µ(t) approaches µlimi , we can get
lim
µ→µlimi
E
(t)
i = E
lim
i . (38)
We denote by n the number of iterations when the proposed
auction concludes. Recall that the price step is ∆. Thus µ(T ) =
∆ × n + µ(0). When n grows, µ(T ) increases. Since E(T )i is
a decreasing function of µ(T ), the summation of bids E(T ) =∑
i∈N E
(T )
i will decrease as µ
(T ) increases. Therefore, there
always exists an E(T ) that satisfies E(T ) ≤ Etotb such that the
PB concludes the auction. Hence, the number of iterations n
is finite, which completes this proof. 
Last, we analyze the required signaling for the computations
in the non-cooperative scenario. According to Algorithm 2,
each AP first needs to measure the (equivalent) channel power
gains Gi and Ki, and acquire the transmit power pb from the
PB. The only value calculated by each AP and forwarded to
the PB is the optimal bid E(t)i obtained by (37). With all the
bids from the APs, the PB announces the price µ(t) at the end
of each iteration and the allocated energy the allocated energy
E˜?i at last to each AP.
TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
The bandwidth W 100KHz
The noise power σ2 −80dBm
The path-loss factor ζ 2
The transmit power of the PB pb 2Watt
The transmit power of each AP pi 1Watt
The gain per unit throughput for each AP λi 10/Mbps
The distance between the ith source and its AP dAiSi 10m
The distance between the ith source and the PB dPSi 10m
The energy conversion efficiency η 0.5
The number of antennas at the PB 4
The reserve price for the PB µ(0) 0.001
The price step ∆ 0.01
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Fig. 4. The convergence properties of both the proposed algorithms.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate and
compare the performance of both the proposed cooperative and
non-cooperative scenarios. We denote by dAiSi and dPSi the
distance between the ith source and its AP, and the distance
between the ith source and the PB, respectively, ∀i ∈ N .
We assume that all the channels experience quasi-static flat
Rayleigh fading and adopt a distance-dependent pass loss
model such as LdXY = 10
−3 (dXY )
−ζ , where dXY denotes
dAiSi or dPSi and ζ ∈ [2, 5] is the path-loss factor. Notice
that a 30dB average signal power attenuation is assumed at
a reference distance of 1m in the above channel model [12].
The system parameters used in the following simulations are
listed in Table I.
The curves in Figs. 4-5 correspond to a network setup con-
sisting of three AP-source pairs with one randomly generated
channel realization, where the channel power gains between
the APs and sources and the equivalent channel power gains
between the PB and the sources are
G =
[
0.0446
0.1569
0.8628
]
× 10−5, K =
[
0.1616
0.6486
0.4379
]
× 10−4. (39)
With these parameters, we thus can compute [α1, α2, α3] =[
µlim1 , µ
lim
2 , µ
lim
3
]
= [5.6834, 4.7802, 0.4543],
[
Elim1 , E
lim
2 ,
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Fig. 5. The optimal allocated energy and optimal DL WET time for each AP-source pair versus Etotb in the case of N = 3 for both the proposed cooperative
and non-cooperative scenarios.
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Fig. 6. The average allocated energy and average DL WET time for each AP-source pair versus Etotb in the case of both the proposed cooperative and
non-cooperative scenarios.
Elim3
]
= [0.1676, 0.0989, 0.3299] and [Eo1 , E
o
2 , E
o
3 ] = [0.6325,
0.8307, 1.3247] based on (17), (12) and (19), respectively.
Fig. 4 illustrates the convergence properties in the case
Etotb = 1Joule
8 for both the proposed water-filling based
distributed algorithm in Algorithm 1 and the auction based dis-
tributed algorithm in Algorithm 2. It is shown in Fig. 4(a) that
the value of ν starts from ν = maxi∈N {αi} = α1 = 5.6834,
turns to ν = α2 = 4.7802 and ν = α3 = 0.4543. Then
it is confirmed that ν exists between α3 and α2. With the
bisection method, the proposed water-filling based distributed
8We consider T = 1s to guarantee the consistency of all physical units.
algorithm converges within few iterations and the desired
ν is achieved. In Fig. 4(b), with the increasing price µ(t)
(as the iteration index t increases), the third AP-source pair
first quits the auction when µ(t) ≥ µlim3 and its last bid
is approximately equal to Elim3 = 0.3299 (when the price
step ∆ is sufficiently small). When the price µ(t) continues
to rise, the bids of the first and the second AP-source pairs
will decrease till the summation of the bids is smaller than
Etotb . Then the PB concludes the auction, sets t = T and
allocates the energy to each AP-source pair based on (33),
which validates the convergence of the proposed auction based
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Fig. 7. The average social welfare (i.e., the weighted sum throughput) of both
the proposed cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios versus Etotb in the
case of different number of participating AP-source pairs. The social welfare
in the non-cooperative scenario is actually the aggregate of the utilities of all
the AP-source pairs and the PB.
distributed algorithm.
Fig. 5 shows the optimal allocated energy and optimal
DL WET time for each AP-source pair versus Etotb in the
case of N = 3 for both the proposed cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios. It can be observed in Fig. 5(a) that the
first AP-source pair, which has the largest α1 = 5.6834, is first
allocated energy by the PB. Then the second and the third AP-
source pairs with α2 = 4.7802 and α3 = 0.4543 are allocated
energy by the PB subsequently. With the increasing of Etotb ,
the optimal allocated energy E?i for each AP-source pair in
the cooperative scenario converges to Eoi and equals E
o
i when
Etotb ≥
∑
i∈N E
o
i . Meanwhile, as expected, the final allocated
energy E˜?i for each AP-source pair in the non-cooperative
scenario can efficiently match that in the cooperative scenario
(i.e., E?i ), when E
tot
b is small. But E˜
?
i plummets to zero
since the value of Etotb exceeds that of
∑
i∈N E
(0)
i , which
is due to the quitting of the PB in the adopted auction
mechanism. Note that when µ(0) is sufficiently small, the
energy payment of each AP to the PB can be ignored in its
own utility function. In this case, the non-cooperative scenario
can be approximated to the cooperative scenario. Thus, the
optimal bid E(0)i from each AP should approximately equal
to Eoi , which leads to
∑
i∈N E
(0)
i ≈
∑
i∈N E
o
i . Therefore,
the approach of E?i to E
o
i and the plummeting of E˜
?
i to zero
occur almost simultaneously, as depicted in Fig. 5(a).
Fig. 5(b) shows the trends of both τ?i and τ˜
?
i versus E
tot
b .
With the increasing of Etotb , the optimal DL WET time of the
first AP-source pair first decreases and then increases while
others remain the same. This is because the first AP-source
pair is allocated energy first. When Etotb is small, the harvested
energy for the source mainly comes from its associated AP,
which corresponds to the case τi > τ ′i (see Proposition 1).
But, with the assistance of the PB, the AP can shorten its DL
WET time, which leads to the decrease of τ?i (or τ˜
?
i ). When
Etotb continually increases, the source can harvest more energy
from the PB, which corresponds to the case that the DL WET
time is dominated by the PB, i.e., τi = τ ′i (see Proposition 1).
In this case, the value of τ?i (or τ˜
?
i ) grows as the value of E
tot
b
increases. Moreover, we can observe the same tendency of the
second and the third AP-source pairs when they are allocated
energy. When Etoti ≥
∑
i∈N E
o
i , τ
?
i of each AP-source pair
in the cooperative scenario becomes constant as E?i = E
o
i ,
almost at the same time, τ˜?i for each AP-source pair in the
non-cooperative scenario equals that in the case each source
only harvests energy from its own AP, which is caused by the
quitting of the PB.
Now we show the average performance of both the proposed
scenarios and each curve hereafter is averaged over 104
randomly generated channel realizations. Fig. 6 demonstrates
the average allocated energy and average DL WET time
for each AP-source pair versus Etotb in both the proposed
cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. E [E?i ], E[E˜?i ],
E [τ?i ] and E [τ˜?i ] are averaged for each AP-source pair and
averaged over 104 channel realizations. It can be observed in
Fig. 6(a) that the optimal allocated energy in the cooperative
scenario E [E?i ] rises with the increasing of Etotb . But E [E?i ]
decreases with the increment of the number of participating
AP-source pairs with a given Etotb because E [E?i ] is averaged
for each AP-source pair. All E [E?i ]s corresponding to different
N converge to a constant value with the increasing of Etotb ,
because the larger Etotb is, the larger is the probability of
Etotb ≥
∑
i∈N E
o
i in each simulation block with one channel
realization. For the non-cooperative scenario, E[E˜?i ] closely
matches E [E?i ] when Etotb is small, but converges to zero
when Etotb is sufficiently large due to the quitting of the PB.
Fig. 6(b) depicts both E [τ?i ] and E [τ˜?i ] versus Etotb . When
Etotb increases, both E [τ?i ] and E [τ˜?i ] decrease first and then
increase, and they converge to different values for the reason
shown in Fig. 5(b). Besides, when the number of participating
AP-source pairs rises, the turning point of the corresponding
curve appears later. The reason is that the more AP-source
pairs, the less energy allocated to each source from the PB.
Then, a larger value of Etotb is needed to make the DL WET
time at each source dominated by the PB.
Fig. 7 presents the average social welfare of both the
proposed cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios versus
Etotb in the case of different number of participating AP-source
pairs. The social welfare in the non-cooperative scenario is
assumed to be the aggregate of the utilities of all the AP-
source pairs and the PB. It can be observed that the network
setup with a larger N in either proposed scenario achieves a
better social welfare performance due to the energy resource
brought by the new joined AP-source pairs. The average social
welfare of the cooperative scenario increases as Etotb grows
and approaches a constant value when Etotb is large enough.
This is because when Etotb ≥
∑
i∈N E
o
i , as shown in Fig. 5(a),
the allocated energy to each source will be a constant value
and independent of Etotb , which leads to the saturation of the
social welfare performance. In the non-cooperative scenario,
as Etotb increases, the average social welfare performance
closely matches that in the cooperative scenario when Etotb
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is small, but then deteriorates due to the quitting of the PB
when Etotb ≥
∑
i∈N E
(0)
i . Notice that when E
tot
b = 0, i.e.,
without the PB, the average social welfare performance is
always the worst.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the joint time and energy allo-
cation of a power beacon (PB)-assisted wireless-powered
communication network (WPCN) with multiple access point
(AP)-source pairs and a PB. We consider both cooperative
and non-cooperative scenarios corresponding to the situations
whether the PB provides wireless charing service to each
AP-source pair for free or not. Moreover, the social welfare
was maximized in the proposed cooperative scenario and the
respective utility of each AP and the PB was maximized in
the non-cooperative scenario. The numerical results validated
the convergence of both the proposed water-filling based and
auction based distributed algorithms. It was demonstrated that
the average social welfare of the cooperative scenario improves
as either the number of participating AP-source pairs or the
total energy of the PB increases, but saturates when the total
energy of the PB is sufficiently large. Moreover, the average
social welfare performance of the non-cooperative scenario
closely matches that in the cooperative scenario when the
total energy of the PB is small, but deteriorates when the total
energy of the PB is sufficiently large, which is caused by the
quitting of the PB in the adopted auction mechanism.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To proceed, we first derive the second-order derivative of
Si (τi) with respect to τi. After some simplifications, we have
∂2Si (τi)
∂τi2
= − λiW (Ai +Bi)
2
(1− τi) (1− τi +Aiτi +Bi)2 ln 2
. (40)
where Ai =
G2iηpi
σ2 and Bi =
GiηEiKi
σ2 . Since
∂2Si(τi)
∂τi2
< 0,
Si (τi) is a concave function of τi. Thus, the optimal solution
can be obtained by setting the first-order derivative of Si(τi)
equal to zero and comparing the obtained stationary points
with the constraints. That is, ∂Si(τi)∂τi = 0. After some algebraic
manipulations, we have
zi ln (zi)− zi + 1 = Ai, (41)
where zi = 1 + Aiτi+Bi1−τi . Note that zi > 1 as Ai > 0 and
0 < τi < 1. With reference to [12], f (zi) = zi ln (zi)−zi+1
is strictly increasing when zi > 1 and f (1) = 0. We then can
deduce that there exists a unique solution, denoted by z†i > 1,
to the equality f(zi) = Ai. After some manipulations, we get
z†i = exp
(
W
(
Ai − 1
exp(1)
)
+ 1
)
, (42)
in whichW (x) is the LambertW function that is the solution
to the equality x = W exp(W). Let τ †i denote the optimal
solution to the equation (41). Then, we have 1+Aiτ
†
i +Bi
1−τ†i
= z†i .
Rearranging this equality, we get
τ †i =
z†i − 1−Bi
z†i − 1 +Ai
. (43)
Recall the constraints on τi in the optimization problem (9)
that 0 < τi < 1 and τi ≥ Eipb , we have
τi (Ei) = max
{
τ †i ,
Ei
pb
}
, (44)
since it is easy to check that τ †i < 1 and τ
†
i > 0 when Ei = 0.
To further expand (44), we compare the two terms τ †i and
Ei/pb and obtain that τ
†
i < Ei/pb only if
Ei >
pb
(
z†i − 1
)
σ2(
z†i − 1
)
σ2 +Giη (piGi + pbKi)
, (45)
which is obtained by substituting the expression of Ai and
Bi into (43). Therefore, the optimal solution τi (Ei) to the
problem (9) can be further expressed as
τi (Ei) =
{
τ †i , if 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Elimi ,
Ei
pb
, if Elimi < Ei < pb,
(46)
where Elimi is defined as the right-hand side of (45). This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2 AND PROPOSITION 2
When 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Elimi , by replacing τi in (10) with τi (Ei),
with careful simplification, we have
Si (Ei) =λiW Giη (piGi + EiKi)(
z†i − 1
)
σ2 +G2i ηpi
log2
(
z†i
)
=λiW
Giη (piGi + EiKi)(
z†i − 1
)
σ2 +G2i ηpi
(
z†i − 1
)
σ2 +G2i ηpi
z†i σ2 ln 2
=
λiWGiη (piGi + EiKi)
z†i σ2 ln 2
.
(47)
where the second equality is based on that z†i ln
(
z†i
)
−z†i+1 =
G2iηpi
σ2 (please refer to the proof in Appendix A). Thus, the
gradient of Si (Ei) is a constant, denoted by αi, given by
αi =
∂Si (Ei)
∂Ei
=
λiWGiηKi
z†i σ2 ln 2
> 0. (48)
When Elimi < Ei < pb, by inserting the expression of τi
into (10), we have
Si (Ei) = λiW
(
1− Ei
pb
)
log2
(
1 +
XiEi
pb − Ei
)
, (49)
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where Xi , Giη(piGi+pbKi)σ2 . By deriving the first-order
derivative of Si (Ei), we have the gradient of Si (Ei) when
Elimi < Ei < pb, denoted by βi (Ei), as
βi (Ei) =
∂Si (Ei)
∂Ei
=− λiW
pb
log2
(
1 +
XiEi
pb − Ei
)
+
λiWXi
(pb − Ei +XiEi) ln 2 .
(50)
Moreover, we derive the second-order derivative of Si (Ei)
and obtain
∂2Si (Ei)
∂Ei
2 = −
λiWX
2
i pb
(pb − Ei +XiEi)2 (pb − Ei) ln 2
< 0. (51)
Thus, when Elimi < Ei < pb, βi (Ei) is strictly decreasing.
Furthermore, by inserting the expression of Elimi , given by
(12), into βi (Ei), with simplification, we have
βi
(
Elimi
)
=
λiW
z†i pb ln 2
(
Xi −
(
z†i ln
(
z†i
)
− z†i + 1
))
=
λiW
z†i pb ln 2
(
Giη (piGi + pbKi)
σ2
− G
2
i ηpi
σ2
)
= αi.
(52)
Hence, on 0 ≤ Ei < pb, Si (Ei) is differentiable and the
gradient of Si (Ei) is continuous.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
According to Proposition 3, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions are both necessary and sufficient for the
optimality of the problem (21). To proceed, we first discuss
the solution of a problem without the condition 0  E  Eo.
By removing 0  E  Eo, we have the Lagrangian as
L =
∑
i∈N
Si (Ei)− ν
(∑
i∈N
Ei − Etotb
)
, (53)
Taking the stationarity condition, we have
∇Si (Ei)− ν = 0, (54)
and the KKT conditions are
ν
(∑
i∈N
Ei − Etotb
)
= 0, (55a)
ν ≥ 0. (55b)
Recall that the gradient of Si (Ei) is subject to that 0 ≤
∇Si (Ei) ≤ αi when 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Eoi , on that basis, we begin
to discuss the following cases.
Case 1: When Elimi < Ei ≤ Eoi , ∇Si (Ei) = βi (Ei),
βi (Ei) is strictly decreasing and 0 ≤ βi (Ei) < αi. Therefore,
given 0 ≤ ν < αi, there always exists a unique E?i satisfying
(54). By solving that β (E?i ) = ν with (18), we have
zi ln (zi) +
(
νpb ln 2
λiW
− 1
)
zi + 1 = Xi, (56)
where Xi =
Giη(piGi+pbKi)
σ2 , zi = 1 +
XiE
?
i
pb−E?i and zi > 1
as Xi > 0 and Elimi < E
?
i ≤ Eoi . We denote by z§i > 1
the solution of (56). Then, we denote E?i = γi (ν) and obtain
γi (ν) by solving z
§
i = 1 +
XiE
?
i
pb−E?i as
γi (ν) =
pb
(
z§i − 1
)
σ2(
z§i − 1
)
σ2 +Giη (piGi + pbKi)
. (57)
We then prove that z§i is unique. We first define a function
that g (zi) = zi ln (zi) + (Yi − 1) zi + 1, which is the left-
hand side of (56) and Yi = νpb ln 2λiW . By deriving the first-order
derivative of g (zi), we have
∂g (zi)
∂zi
= ln zi + Yi. (58)
Therefore, as Yi ≥ 0, g (zi) is monotonically increasing when
zi > 1. When zi = 1, we have that g (1) = Yi. Consequently,
there exists a unique solution z§i > 1 of the function g (zi) =
Xi, if Xi > Yi. By comparing Xi and Yi, we have
Xi − Yi =Giη (piGi + pbKi)
σ2
− νpb ln 2
λiW
>
GiηpbKi
σ2
− νpb ln 2
λiW
>
pb ln 2
λiW
(
λiWGiηKi
σ2 ln 2
− αi
)
> 0.
(59)
Hence, z§i > 1 is the unique solution of (56).
Furthermore, as βi (Ei) is strictly decreasing, γi (ν) is
strictly decreasing as well. Because of the continuous property
of ∇Si (Ei), we have γi (0) = Eoi and γi (αi) = Elimi .
Case 2: When 0 < Ei ≤ Elimi , ∇Si (Ei) = αi. Thus, given
ν = αi, any value of Ei between 0 and Elimi could satisfy
(54). However, by considering the KKT conditions, we have
that E?i = E
tot
b −
∑
j∈N\{i}E
?
j .
The remaining case of ν > αi, leads to E?i = 0. In
summary, we have proved Proposition 4, where ν is chosen
to meet the total energy constraint that
∑
i∈N E
?
i = E
tot
b .
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
The problem (28) can be solved by following a similar pro-
cedure for problem (8). We first apply the optimal relationship
between τi and Ei and simply problem (28) to the following
one
max
Ei
Ui
(
Ei, µ
(t)
)
, s.t. 0 ≤ Ei < pb, (60)
where
Ui
(
Ei, µ
(t)
)
= Si (Ei)− µ(t)Ei, (61)
with Si (Ei) defined in (14).
Based on the gradient of Si (Ei) shown in (16), we can
readily obtain the gradient of Ui
(
Ei, µ
(t)
)
with respect to Ei,
denoted by ∇Ui (Ei), as follows.
∇Ui (Ei) =
{
αi − µ(t), if 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Elimi ,
βi (Ei)− µ(t), if Elimi < Ei < pb.
(62)
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As βi
(
Elimi
)
= αi and βi (Ei) is strictly decreasing (refer
to Appendix B), ∇Ui (Ei) is continuous on 0 ≤ Ei < pb,
remains constant when 0 ≤ Ei ≤ Elimi and strictly decreasing
when Elimi < Ei < pb. Then, we can infer that when µ
(t) ≥
αi, ∇Ui (Ei) ≤ 0, which results in that E(t)i = 0. When
µ(t) < αi, as µ(t) > 0 and according to Proposition 3, we
have that E(t)i is the unique solution of βi (Ei) − µ(t) = 0
and Elimi < E
(t)
i ≤ Eoi < pb. According to the analysis in
Appendix C, we have E(t)i = γi
(
µ(t)
)
. In a summary, we
have
E
(t)
i =
{
0, if µ(t) ≥ µlimi ,
γi
(
µ(t)
)
, if µ(t) < µlimi ,
(63)
where µlimi = αi and it is defined as the maximum acceptable
price for the ith AP.
With the optimal E(t)i , the ith AP thus can decide the
optimal τ (t)i . The utility function of the ith AP with the given
E
(t)
i and µ
(t) can be reduced to
Ui (τi) =λi(1− τi)W log2
1 + Giη
(
τipiGi + E
(t)
i Ki
)
(1− τi)σ2

− µ(t)E(t)i .
(64)
Based on the analysis in Appendix A, we can directly obtain
that
τ
(t)
i =
{
τ †i , if 0 ≤ E(t)i ≤ Elimi ,
E
(t)
i
pb
, if Elimi < E
(t)
i < pb.
(65)
Note that when µ(t) < µlimi , γi
(
µ(t)
)
> γi
(
µlimi
)
and
γi
(
µlimi
)
= Elimi . We now can express the optimal solution
to problem (28) in a compact form given by
(
τ
(t)
i , E
(t)
i
)
=

(
(z†i−1)σ2
(z†i−1)σ2+G2iηpi
, 0
)
, if µ(t) ≥ µlimi ,(
γi(µ(t))
pb
, γi
(
µ(t)
))
, if µ(t) < µlimi .
(66)
This completes the proof.
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